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Introduction
Analyzing the conditions which are likely to bring about international
conflict, Hammond (1965) concluded that "The prime source of war in the future
is likely to lie in cognitive differences concerning the means as to how com-
mon ends may be best achieved (pp. 44-45)." Hammond's conclusion follows
from what he discerned to be the changing nature of interpersonal conflict.
He saw "a change from a world in which there has been conflict over ends . .
.
but agreement as to the means ... to a future in which there will be agree-
ment over ends but cognitive conflict over means (p. 46)."
By calling this new type of conflict cognitive , Hammond identified it
with ideas, or better, with ideologies. The conflict is cognitive because
it results from differences in what people believe to be the best way to
solve their problems. Cognitive conflict, then, is that type of interpers-
onal conflict that results when men think differently about mutual problems.
It is interpersonal conflict over means
.
Because the role that cognitive conflict plays in the affairs of men is
growing, it becomes increasingly important to understand the consequences
of cognitive conflict. This study constitutes one step in that direction;
namely to discover the effects of cognitive conflict on interpersonal
attraction.
Background and Theory
The research literature pertinent to the present study is reviewed in
the following order; first, the literature of cognitive conflict, and then
the literature relevant to the cognitive conflict -interpersonal attraction
hypothesis.
Cognitive Conflict
Cognitive conflict is an interpersonal, noncompetitive type of conflict
arising when persons working together to achieve a mutually desired goal
think differently about their common problem.
Rappoport (1965) states three pre-conditions for the occurrence of cog-
nitive conflict: (1) mutual aims or goals, i.e., shared fate; (2) discrepant
cognitive processes, i.e., individual differences in thinking; and (3) un-
certainty, i.e., equivocal environmental information.
Mutual aims or goals . In order to classify interpersonal conflict as
cognitive, it is necessary that the parties in conflict be working to achieve
mutually desired goals, and that both parties share the consequences of their
joint efforts. Experiments on cognitive conflict must, therefore, be ar-
ranged so that it is to the advantage of both parties to cooperate with each
other in order to maximize their chances of being successful.
Discrepant cognitive processes . The primary cause of cognitive con-
flict is differences in the way two persons think about their mutual prob-
lem. This condition is often described in terms such as conflicting value
systems or ideological differences.
It is important at this point to distinguish between cognitive conflict
and competitive conflict. Cognitive conflict is noncompetitive ; it can
occur in the absence of competition under conditions of cooperation. The
theoretical distinction between competitive and noncompetitive conflict
rests on the assumption of different causal factors (Rappoport, 1965). With
competitive conflict the primary cause of conflict is assumed to be desire
for individual gain; one person seeks to gain something at the expense of
another, e.g., player motives in a zero-sum game such as poker in which one
player's loss is his opponent's gain. With cognitive conflict, however,
persons are working cooperatively toward a goal mutually desired by both,
and it is assumed that the primary cause of conflict is discrepant thinking
about their problem.
Rappoport uses the example of a bridge game to exemplify the two dif-
ferent kinds of conflict. Competitive conflict exists between opponents in
a bridge game, while noncompetitive, cognitive conflict exists between
partners .
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate in detail the
theoretical distinction between competitive and noncompetitive conflict, it
is important to note that this distinction separates cognitive conflict re-
search from the great body of existing game- theory research, which deals al-
most exclusively with competitive conflict.
Furthermore, while competitive conflict has been researched extensively,
research on cognitive conflict was only begun in 1963. This fact is partic-
ularly unfortunate in view of the opinion of many social scientists (see
Hammond, 1965) that in the future man's most pressing problems will be how
to resolve ideological differences, i.e., cognitive conflict over what means
to utilize to achieve generally agreed upon ends. A timely example from the
present is the cognitive conflict between civil rights moderates and ex-
tremists in the United States over what means are most appropriate to attain
equal rights for the Negro.
Uncertainty
.
Uncertainty is a crucial situational factor for the de-
velopment of cognitive conflict. Serious cognitive conflict is only ex-
pected to occur when a situation is uncertain enough to support different
points of view. If information from the environment is unambiguous, and/or
the consequences of alternative actions fully predictable, conflicting
points of view may either not arise, or be immediately resolved.
Uncertainty can of course take different forms. Even if information is
clear cut, it may be difficult to organize. Because the environment "scat-
ters its effects randomly" (Heider, 1958, p. 72), i.e., because the informa-
tion from the environment upon which the organism bases its decisions is
frequently equivocal and ambiguous, cognitive conflicts can and do frequently
arise.
The Laboratory Model of Cognitive Conflict
To study cognitive conflict under controlled conditions, Hammond created
a research paradigm based upon Brunswik's (195 2, 1956) perceptual lens model.
The lens model of cognitive conflict has been used to construct several cog-
nitive conflict tasks, different in content, but with identical formal prop-
erties which satisfy the three theoretical conditions of cognitive conflict
listed above. A review by Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (1964) provides a de-
scription of the general character of the lens model, and its potential for
studies of cognition. The general rationale of the lens model paradigm has
been discussed by Hammond (1965, 1966). For examples of its application to
the study of interpersonal conflict see Rappoport (1965) and Todd, Hammond,
and Wilkins (1966). The technical basis for the analysis of data produced
by the lens model is discussed in Hursch, Hammond, and Hursch (1964),
Hammond, Hursch, and Todd (1964), Hammond and Summers (1965), Summers and
Hammond (1966), Peterson, Hammond, and Summers (1965, 1966). For an excel-
lent general philosophical discussion of the lens model, see Hammond (1964)
.
Brunswik's lens model, as it has been modified for the study of
interpersonal cognitive conflict, is diagrammed in Figure 1. Note that the
generation of cognitive conflict between subjects is a two stage process.
Training stage . In the training stage subjects receive discrepant ex-
periences as they are given individual practice on different versions of the
same multiple-cue probability learning task. The training tasks for both
subjects are identical except for the cue validities; each subject is ex-
posed to a substantially different set of cue validities. During training,
subjects therefore learn to base their judgments of the distal variable
(criterion) on different cues. In theoretical terms, the Ss develop differ-
ent cognitive sys.tems based on different cue dependencies.
For example, in the training tasks diagrammed, it is clear that subject
1 and subject 2 are exposed to substantially different cue validities. In
learning to predict the criterion variable, subject 1 will learn to depend
mostly upon cue #1, less upon cue #2, and least upon cue #3. Subject 2,
however, will learn to depend mostly upon cue #3, less upon cue #2, and
least upon cue #1. As a result of their experience with the task, assuming
learning occurs for both subjects, subject 1 and subject 2 will have developed
substantially different cognitive systems.
Conflict stage . In the conflict stage, subjects with different cue-
dependencies are brought together to work jointly on a third version of the
same task, the conflict task. The conflict task differs from both training
tasks in that it utilizes a new set of cue validities different from the
validities used in either of the practice tasks. Now, on each trial, sub-
jects are required to agree among themselves on a single, joint judgment of
the criterion variable. As indicated in the diagram, the subjects must now
reconcile their different individual judgments in some fashion if they are
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Diagram of the two-stage lens model paradigm for the study of two-
person cognitive conflict.
.to .reach agreement on a single joint judgment. The cognitive conflict
should emerge at this point because each subject will be relying on cue
validities substantially different from those of his partner.
Satisfying the conditions of cognitive conflict . The three conditions
given as necessary requirements for cognitive conflict are satisfied by the
laboratory model in the following manner. Mutual aims or goals and shared
fate are arranged through instructions to the subjects which stress the
importance of the mutual goal, i.e., accurate joint judgments in predicting
the criterion variable, and a procedure which provides subjects with shared
fate in the form of accuracy feedback on their joint judgments . Discrepant
cognitive processes are induced in training where subjects are given dis-
crepant experiences with the task from which they learn different sets of
cue dependencies. The degree of uncertainty is built into the task itself
by specifying the degree of correlation between each cue variable and the
criterion variable. The task typically contains irreducible uncertainty in
that it is not completely determined, i.e., the multiple correlation coef-
ficient expressing the degree of relatedness between cues and criterion is
less than unity.
Aside from meeting the conditions of cognitive conflict specified above,
the laboratory model is a research paradigm that allows relevant character-
istics of subjects' cognitive systems to be specified by the experimenter.
Thus, the investigator can manipulate precisely the degree and kind of cog-
nitive differences the subjects bring to the conflict task.
Research based on the laboratory model of cognitive conflict
.
Todd,
Hammond, and Wilkins (1966) studied the differential effects of ambiguous
and exact feedback on two-person conflict and compromise. In the ambiguous
condition subjects were provided with "right or wrong" outcome feedback for
their joint judgment of the criterion. Subjects in the exact feedback condi-
tion were given feedback for their joint judgments consisting of the exact
criterion values they were attempting to predict. Results indicated that the
two feedback conditions did not have a markedly differential effect on the
reduction of conflict, but did have a differential effect on whether conflict
would be resolved by compromise or capitulation. Where exact information
was provided as feedback, conflict was resolved by compromise ("splitting
the difference" between the two individual judgments) ; where right or wrong
outcome feedback was provided, conflict was resolved by capitulation ("giv-
ing in" to the individual judgment of one of the persons)
.
Rappoport (1965) studied the effects of an analytical and an intuitive
cognitive set on initial conflict, conflict persistence and tendency to
compromise. Subjects given the analytical set received instructions de-
signed "to encourage a problem- solving, system-building orientation toward
the task. Subjects given the intuitive set received instructions designed
to induce a 'hunch-playing* or general-impression orientation toward the
task (p. 327)." Results indicated that subjects with the intuitive set
developed less initial conflict (conflict over the first 10 trials of a 50
trial task) and had a greater tendency to resolve their conflict by compro-
mise, than subjects with an analytical set. The difference in conflict
persistence between the two groups was not significant.
Hammond, Todd, Wilkins, and Mitchell (1966) used the lens model para-
digm in three different studies of two-person cognitive conflict. The first
study investigated the effect of early versus late confrontation with crit-
ical events (large cognitive differences between pairs) on the reduction of
conflict over time. "A critical trial was designed in which the expected
divergence in judgment was 18 points (on a 20 point scale). This divergence
was ... extreme ..., since ... discrepancies in judgment on all other trials
were limited in range from 4 to 12 points" (p. 348). For the early confron-
tation group, the critical trial was placed sixth in the series of 20 trials;
for the late group, the critical trial appeared on the sixteenth trial. Re-
sults indicated a substantial reduction of both overt and covert conflict
over trials for both the early and late groups. Neither overt nor covert
conflict reduction was differentially affected by the placement of critical
trials.
The second study investigated the effects of different types of verbal
interchange between persons. Subjects were trained to use two types of per-
suasive techniques in resolving their conflict. Subjects in the "own focus"
condition were trained to present only their own point of view in the verbal
interchange with the other person. Subjects in the "region of validity"
condition were trained to present not only their own point of view but also
to delineate the domain of validity of the other person's argument, i.e.,
to restate accurately the other person's position, giving reasons for agree-
ment and disagreement with the other person's argument. Results indicated
that while conflict was substantially reduced over trials for both experi-
mental groups, the type of persuasive technique employed by the subjects in
their verbal interchange did not differentially affect conflict reduction.
The third study investigated the effect of differences in complexity
of the subjects' cognitive systems on conflict reduction. One member of
each pair of subjects was trained to use a complex cognitive system, i.e.,
to use a nonlinear relationship between cue and criterion, and the other
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member of the pair was trained to use a simple cognitive system, i.e., a
linear relationship between cue and criterion. Results suggested that the
complex subject was less willing to compromise in the face of large differ-
ences than the simple subject; the complex subject stayed closer to his
original policy. Not only did the simple subject relinguish his training
more readily, but the greater the difference in actual judgments, the more
cognitive change induced in the simple subject.
Socially induced cognitive differences ; a_ methodological innovation .
The studies of cognitive conflict reviewed above demonstrate that cognitive
conflict is amenable to laboratory investigation using the lens model para-
digm. However, in all the studies reported, the cognitive conflict between
persons has been generated by training subjects to think differently about
their mutual decision-making task. One of the challenges to make the lens
model paradigm more representative is to isolate cognitive differences as
they exist outside the laboratory rather than to artificially produce them.
If the results of research based on the paradigm are to be generalizable to
conflict situations existing beyond the laboratory, it must be demonstrated
that cognitive differences acquired in natural social experience generate
conflicts with the same properties as those produced by differential labor-
atory training. The studies described below are methodologically different
from the preceding studies because subjects were selected for cognitive
differences rather than trained to be cognitively different.
Summers (1967) selected persons who believed that the status of minor-
ity groups could be changed only through increased education and paired
them with persons who believed that both increased education and government
legislation were necessary. When these subject pairs attempted to reach
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mutual decisions regarding minority status, their disagreements were de-
scribed as being caused by socially-induced cognitive differences. That is,
their previous social experience had in some way led these subjects to think
differently about the problem of minority status. Results indicated that
the amount of initial conflict between j3s was inversely related to subsequent
compromise. However, while Summers selected subjects for cognitive differ-
ences, he did not manipulate these differences as an independent variable.
A study by Rappoport (1967) was specifically designed to investigate
the effects of different levels of socially induced cognitive differences
on cognitive conflict. He selected pairs of subjects who, presumably as a
function of differential social experience thought differently (judgments
negatively related; X = -.75), similarly (judgments positively related;
X = .93), and independently (judgments not systematically related; X = .09)
r r
about racial integration. Results indicated that the pairs characterized
by cognitive differences showed significantly more conflict than the others.
His results parallel earlier findings (Rappoport, 1967) obtained with dis-
crepancy trained subjects on a very similar task, and it was concluded that
socially-induced and laboratory- induced (trained) cognitive differences have
similar effects on major components of the lens model.
The foregoing may be summarized by stating that (1) the study of cog-
nitive conflict is important, (2) that a model has been developed for its
study, and (3) that a body of empirical data regarding its resolution has
been collected.
Cognitive Conflict and Interpersonal Attraction
None of the research carried out to date by Hammond and associates has
investigated the consequences of cognitive conflict on any variables other
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than those related to the outputs of the lens model. In both the Summers
(1966) and Rappoport (1967) studies, the dependent variables studied were
measures of cognitive conflict resolution generated by the lens model method-
ology. In short, prior research has studied cognitive conflict for the most
part only as a dependent variable; seldom as an independent variable and
.never as an independent variable affecting a dependent variable outside the
framework of the lens model. The present study is intended to explore the ef-
fect of cognitive conflict on interpersonal attraction, a dependent variable
formally and substantively beyond the framework of the lens model.
Are cognitive conflict and interpersonal attraction related ? One of
the aims of the present study is to test the hypothesis that conflict and
attraction are related. The support for such a hypothesis is derived from
several different sources.
First , folk psychology or the psychology of common sense suggests a
relation between cognitive similarity and interpersonal attraction. One
common notion about interpersonal attraction is that it varied with simi-
larity; e.g., "Birds of a feather flock together." Since cognitive conflict
varies inversely with cognitive similarity (Rappoport, 1967) , might it not
follow that interpersonal attraction varies inversely with cognitive con-
flict? The notion of similarity as a determinant of attraction is not very
helpful because it is indiscriminate; it does not specify which similarities
will and which will not affect interpersonal attraction. There is, for
example, neither good reason nor good evidence for believing that persons
with similar blood types are especially attracted to one another. In short,
it is not apparent whether or not cognitive similarity should be an import-
and determinant of attraction. There is also the problem of reconciling
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the similarity notion with the equally widely held notion that "opposites
attract." Thus, an appeal to folk psychology and common sense results in
equivocal predictions, suggesting that the question must be answered
empirically.
Second , observations of subjects discussing their policy differences in
cognitive conflict experiments suggest a relation between cognitive conflict
and interpersonal attraction. Subjects working in cognitive conflict ex-
periments typically show serious emotional involvement in the task. For
example, it has been reported (Rappoport, 1968, personal communication) that
while working together under conditions of cognitive conflict, subjects
often argued heatedly over their differences and sometimes continued their
arguments after the experiment was over. But while such observations of
emotional arousal under conditions of cognitive conflict suggest an affective
component to cognitive conflict, they have not revealed whether subjects are
more or less attracted to each other as a consequence of their conflict
experience.
Third , a review of the research literature suggests not only that cog-
nitive conflict and interpersonal attraction are related, but also that they
are inversely related; i.e., as cognitive conflict is reduced between sub-
jects, interpersonal attraction between subjects increases.
In more general terms, the question addressed by this study, i.e., can
changes in interpersonal attraction be predicted as a function of the amount
of cognitive conflict persons experience in a decision task?, is a question
directed at the relation between cognition and emotion as determinants of
behavior. The idea that cognition and emotion interact in determining
behavior goes back as far as Plato (see Allport, 1954) who conceived of the
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mind as made up of three inter-related, interacting faculties— cognition
(thought), affection (feeling), and conation (striving). This conception is
reflected in modern concepts of behavior which construe the individual act
as deriving from a cognitive-emotional-motivational matrix of determinants
(see Scheerer, 1954)
.
But the aim of the present study is limited to examining the specific
relation between how people think about a mutual problem (cognition) and
how they feel about each other (emotion); in particular, the relation between
cognitive conflict (the extent to which people think differently about a
mutual problem) and interpersonal attraction (the extent to which they are
attracted to each other)
.
In the empirical social psychological literature, the idea that cogni-
tive conflict has an affective emotional component is suggested in a series
of group pressure experiments by Asch (1956). Asch's experimental procedure
was to ask a subject to announce his judgment of an obvious matter after hear-
ing a unanimous majority (who were accomplices of the experimenter) make a
false judgment. Asch has noted that the naive subjects, confronted by a
discrepancy between two normally trustworthy sources of information— their
own senses and the judgments of others, experienced a profound conflict and
many became emotionally upset.
The Asch studies are clearly relevant to the question addressed by the
present study. However, since Asch was primarily interested in the modifica-
tion of individual judgment by group influence and did not investigate changes
in interpersonal attraction, his results are more suggestive than definitive
of the question at hand.
The prediction of interpersonal attraction
. The task of answering the
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question—are cognitive conflict and interpersonal attraction related?
—
suggests a review of the interpersonal attraction literature; specifically a
review of those studies using interpersonal attraction as a dependent vari-
able, and particularly those studies exploring the effects of cognitive vari-
ables on interpersonal attraction.
The antecedents of interpersonal attraction have been investigated in
several different environmental settings. Most notable of the studies in
a natural setting is Newcomb's study (1956, 1959 and 1961) of the acquaint-
ance process. Newcomb's research objective was to observe the relationship
between attraction and similarity of attitudes as it changed over time. His
objective required (1) that his subjects be complete strangers at the start
of the experiment in order to establish an interpersonal attraction baseline
of zero against which to measure change; (2) that his setting be such that
it would be possible for a high degree of positive attraction to develop;
and (3) that regular and repeated observations be conveniently made.
To fulfill these requirements, the following arrangements were made.
A student house was rented, and male transfer students, all strangers to the
University of Michigan, were offered the opportunity of receiving free room
rent for a full semester. In return, they were to spend four or five hours
a week responding to questionnaires and interviews, and participating in
experiments . From those who submitted applications to live in the house
under these conditions, 17 (the capacity of the house) were selected, no two
of whom had ever lived in the same city, nor attended the same school. The
men were given complete freedom, except for choice of roommates, to conduct
the house as they chose.
In this setting, data was obtained by questionnaire and interview, at
16
semi-weekly intervals. A wide range of attitude responses was obtained,
as well as extensive data concerning interpersonal attraction. Measures of
the latter were derived from responses to direct questions about how favor-
ably each house member felt toward each of the others. Newcomb labeled the
measures "General Liking" responses and his own evaluation of the measures
was that they were quite sensitive toward negative attraction. As measures
of positive attraction, however, they were more often an index of "'admira-
tion at a distance' than of direct contact and communication" (p. 580).
Most notable of those studies carried out in a laboratory setting are
the investigations by Byrne and his associates of attitude similarity and
interpersonal attraction. Typically, Byrne's experimental procedure (see
Byrne, 1961, 1962) involved (1) assessing the subjects' attitudes on a series
of topics, and later (2) presenting the subjects with the attitudes of a
stranger on the same topics and finally, after the subjects have read the
strangers' responses, (3) asking the subjects to rate the strangers on a set
of six 7-point scales including two scales intended to measure attraction of
the subjects for the strangers.
An interesting experiment, prototypic of Byrne's methodology, is an in-
vestigation by Byrne and Nelson (1965) of the differential effects of pro-
portion versus number of similar attitudes on interpersonal attraction. A
4x3 factorial design was utilized which permitted a comparison of the
effect of number of similar attitudes (16, 8, and 4) with the effects of
proportion of similar attitudes (1.00, .67, .50, and .33) on attraction.
Each of the 12 cells contained 14 subjects, divided approximately evenly
with respect to sex.
Each subject responded to one of several forms of an attitude scale
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ranging in length from 4 to 48 items. Responses to each item were made on a
7-point scale and the topics were balanced with respect to degree of import-
ance. The attitude items ranged across a variety of topics including fra-
ternities and sororities, integration, science fiction, discipline for
children, and gardening.
About a week after responding to the attitude scales, the subjects re-
ported in small groups for "another experiment." Subjects were told that
the experiment concerned the accuracy with which individuals can make inter-
personal judgments on the" basis of limited information. They received an
attitude scale purportedly filled out by an anonymous stranger (a student of
the same sex as themselves), read that person's responses and then made
several judgments about him or her. The stranger's attitude scale was act-
ually a bogus one constructed by the experimenter so as to constitute the
desired similarity-dissimilarity ratio for each subject.
After reading the "stranger's" responses, each subject rated him on the
Interpersonal Judgment Scale (Byrne, 1961, 1962; Byrne and Wong, 1962) which
consisted of six 7-point scales concerning intelligence, knowledge of cur-
rent events, morality, adjustment, and two attraction scales (probable lik-
ing for the stranger and probable enjoyment of working with him) . In
previous investigations (e.g., Byrne, 1961) responses to the latter two
scales have been analyzed separately as alternative measures of the dependent
variable. The results suggest that the probable liking scale is the most
sensitive and most reliable measure of interpersonal attraction.
The Newcomb and the Byrne and Nelson studies have been presented as
examples of research methodology used to investigate the antecedents of
interpersonal attraction. The present study investigates the hypothesis
18
that cognitive conflict affects interpersonal attraction and the remainder
of this chapter reviews the support for that hypothesis. First to be con-
sidered will be the results of studies that have investigated the effect of
various stimulus characteristics on interpersonal attraction.
In experimental investigations of interpersonal attraction, various stim-
ulus characteristics associated with an individual have been manipulated and
found to exert an effect on attraction toward that individual (for a review,
see Byrne, Clore and Worchel, 1966) . For example, the Newcomb study of the
student living group found that subjects tended to like (1) those by whom
they thought they were liked, (2) those who they thought would describe them
in most favorable terms, (3) those who agreed with the subjects on general-
ized (Allport-Vernon) values, (4) those who shared proximity with the sub-
jects, "mean attraction among all pairs living on each of the two floors of
the house was higher than for all inter- floor pairs" (Newcomb, 1956, p. 580)
and (5) those with whom they were attitudinally similar, particularly those
with whom they shared similar attitudes regarding characteristics of the
other members of the living group. The proposition that "the greater the
similarity between any two members in assigning General Liking scores to
the other 15 members, the higher their attraction for each other" (p. 582)
received clear support. Individuals in high agreement with each other about
the other 15 house members clearly tended to be attracted to each other.
The Byrne and Nelson study found that attraction was not significantly
affected by the number of similar attitudes shared by subject and stranger,
but was significantly affected only by the proportion of similar attitudes
shared by subject and stranger. Byrne and Nelson utilized these and data
from other published studies (Byrne, 1961a, 1961b, 1962; Byrne and McGraw,
19
1964; Byrne and Wong, 1962) for a total of 790 subjects, and showed that the
functional relationship between proportion of similar attitudes and attrac-
tion is a positive linear one.
Some other stimulus characteristics found to exert an effect on inter-
personal attraction are the expression of positive or negative evaluations
concerning the subject (Backman and Secord, 1959; Byrne and Rhamey, 1965;
Deutsch and Solomon, 1959; Jones, Hester, Farina and Davis, 1959; Keislar,
1961), the sequence in which these evaluations are expressed (Aronson and
Linder, 1965) , behavior which results in the reduction of the threat that
the subject will fail at a task (Kleiner, 1960), behavior which is responsible
for the subject's failure at a task (Lerner, 1965), the administration of
punishment in the form of insults to another individual (Pepitone and
Sherberg, 1957), the fact of being present when the subject is rewarded
(Lott and Lott, 1960), and the proportion of expressed attitudes and opinions
which are similar to those of the subject (Byrne, 1961, 1962; Byrne and
Wong, 1962; Byrne and Nelson, 1965; Byrne and Rhamey, 1965).
With reference to the last series of findings regarding attitude simi-
larity and attraction, it should be noted that no other single variable has
proved to be such a powerful determinant of interpersonal attraction. Spe-
cifically, Byrne has studied the following variables: (1) economic
similarity-dissimilarity (1966), (2) similarity-dissimilarity of personality
characteristics (1967), (3) importance of the topic (Byrne and Rhamey, 1965),
(4) number of similar attitudes (1965), and (5) prestige similarity-
dissimilarity (1966); he has found none to be as important as the proportion
of similar-dissimilar attitudes in effecting change in interpersonal
attraction.
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Several years prior to Byrne, Newcomb (1956) reached a similar conclu-
sion regarding the importance of attitude similarity as a determinant of
attraction:
"In short, I am attempting to defend the thesis that inter-
personal attraction always and necessarily varies with perceived
similarity regarding important and relevant objects (including
the persons themselves) . While I regard similarity of attitudes
as a necessary rather than a sufficient condition, I believe that
it accounts for more of the variance in interpersonal attraction
than does any other single variable." (1956, p. 579)
A reinforcement theory of interpersonal attraction . How may these di-
verse findings
—
particularly the relation between attitude similarity and
interpersonal attraction—be accounted for? A substantial number of investi-
gators have accepted a reinforcement theory of interpersonal attraction
(e.g., Byrne, 1961; Golightly, 1965; Kleiner, 1960; Lott and Lott, 1960;
McDonald, 1962; Nelson, 1965; Newcomb, 1956, 1961; Pepitone and Sherberg,
1957). In essence, the theory states that the relation between attitude
similarity and interpersonal attraction is "a special case of the effect of
positive and negative reinforcement on attraction through the operation of
consensual validation" (Byrne, 1966) .
More specifically, the theory, as derived by Byrne (1961) from a state-
-
ment by Newcomb (1956), states that: (1) Persons have a learned drive to be
logical and to interpret the world correctly (see also Festinger, 1954).
This drive is reinforced by consensual validation and frustrated by con-
sensual invalidation. (2) Perceived attitude similarity reduces the drive
by providing consensual validation and therefore is reinforcing; conversely,
perceived attitude dissimilarity frustrates the drive and is punishing. A
similar attitude, therefore, may be equated with positive reinforcement; a
dissimilar attitude with negative reinforcement. (3) Attraction between
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persons is a function of the extent to which reciprocal rewards are present
in their interaction. (4) Finally, attraction toward a stranger, other things
being equal, should increase as a function of the proportion of similar at-
titudes shared with the stranger (positive reinforcements present in the
interaction) and decreases as a function of the proportion of dissimilar at-
titudes shared with the stranger (negative reinforcements present in the
interaction)
.
In elaborating the reinforcement theory of interpersonal attraction,
Byrne and Nelson (1965) have proposed a law of attraction stating that "at-
traction toward X is a positive linear function of positive reinforcements
received from X" (p. 662) . This tentative law of attraction, A = (A^ mPR^
+ k) , has been demonstrated to hold for a variety of reinforcing stimuli,
including similar and dissimilar attitude statements (see Byrne and Nelson,
1965) .
Implications for the present study . Byrne's major theoretical state-
ment is that interpersonal attraction is a function of the proportion of
similar-dissimilar attitudes shared between persons. If similar and dissimi-
lar attitudes may be equated with cognitive similarities and dissimilarities,
then it follows that cognitive similarities should be reciprocally reinforc-
ing and cognitive dissimilarities should be nonreinforcing. It also follows
that subjects who experience cognitive conflict as a result of their cogni-
tive dissimilarities should subsequently like each other substantially less
than persons who experience less cognitive conflict because of cognitive
similarities. Therefore, it is hypothesized that in the present experiment
an inverse relationship will obtain between cognitive conflict and inter-
personal attraction; i.e., as cognitive conflict is reduced between subjects,
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interpersonal attraction between subjects will increase.
Aims of the present study . The aims of the present study are as follows:
(1) The empirical aim is to test the hypothesis that cognitive conflict is
inversely related to interpersonal attraction. (2) The methodological aim
is to extend the generality of the lens model paradigm of cognitive conflict
by (a) examining an emotional consequence or correlate of cognitive conflict,
and (b) employing a new substantive task involving child-rearing material
that should generate emotional arousal in subjects.
Method
The research design can best be understood in terms of three conceptual
stages: first, subjects were selected for cognitive differences and simi-
larities; second, subjects were brought together to perform a task in which
their cognitive differences would result in cognitive conflict; and third,
subjects were asked to rate their attraction toward their partners at three
different times during the experiment.
Selection of subjects for cognitive differences and similarities . An
assessment instrument was used to select pairs of subjects who thought dif-
ferently and similarly about child-rearing practices, presumably as a con-
sequence of their previous natural social experience. Prior research by
Rappoport (1967) has indicated that pairs of subjects characterized by cog-
nitive differences will experience more conflict than pairs characterized
by cognitive similarities. Thus, conditions of potentially high and low
cognitive conflict were arranged by pairing subjects who thought differently
(high conflict pairs) and similarly (low conflict pairs) to work jointly
on a task in which their cognitive differences would result in two differ-
ent levels of cognitive conflict.
Generation of cognitive conflict . In order to generate conditions of
high and low cognitive conflict, selected subjects worked together on an
uncertain, multi-cue task involving joint judgments about child- rearing
practices. The methodology employed to generate cognitive conflict was based
upon the Hammond (1965; see also Hammond, et al., 1966) research paradigm
for the study of cognitive conflict.
The formal properties of the task were the same as in the cognitive
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conflict studies cited above, i.e., subjects were presented with cues prob-
abilistically related to a criterion variable and asked to make judgments
concerning the value of the criterion. Three cues were used in the task;
the high validity cue correlated -.92 with the criterion, while the cue-
criterion correlations for the other two cues were zero-order-- .19 and -.12,
respectively.
The verbal content of the cues and the criterion, however, was unique
to this study. The criterion to be predicted was the level of adjustment of
a child during his first year of school. The cues were: (1) the PERMIS-
SIVENESS of the child's parents, (2) the USE OF NON-PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE in
disciplining the child, and (3) INDEPENDENCE TRAINING received in the home.
The verbal content of the task was developed in a survey study by Zola and
Rappoport (1968)
.
In the conflict stage of the experiment, subjects were brought to-
gether to make joint judgments of the level of adjustment (criterion) based
upon the levels of permissiveness, non-physical discipline, and independence
training (cue values) . Because the task fulfills the conditions necessary
to generate cognitive conflict (see pp. 2-4 above), it was predicted that
subjects would disagree as to the predicted level of adjustment for the
child. During the conflict stage of the experiment, subjects were required
to make criterion predictions for 15 different cases. Each case or trial
consisted of a different configuration of cue values.
The scales of assessing interpersonal attraction between subjects were
the same as those used by Byrne and his associates (e.g., see Byrne, 1961;
Byrne and Nelson, 1965): (1) a measure of how much subjects like each
other, and (2) a measure of to what extent subjects are willing to work
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together again at some future time. On the basis of prior research, Byrne
(1961) has concluded that these two scales are the most reliable and sensi-
tive measures of interpersonal attraction that he has used.
These measures were repeated at three different times during the ex-
periment: prior to the beginning of the conflict task, i.e., time 0; and
after trials 3 and 13 of the 15 trial task. The zero time measurement was
taken to establish a baseline against which to measure changes in attrac-
tion. Measures were also taken at trials 3 and 13 because prior research
with the conflict paradigm suggested that conflict should be close to max-
imum at trial 3 and substantially reduced by trial 13.
Subjects were asked to rate both their attraction to their partners and
their attraction to the experimenter. Since subjects were not in cognitive
conflict with the experimenter, the latter measure served as a control; if
changes in the dependent variables were reflected in the ratings of the ex-
perimenter, then they would have to be attributed to something other than
the manipulation of the independent variable
.
Independent Variables
To study the effect of cognitive conflict on interpersonal attraction,
the amount of cognitive conflict generated in the conflict task was manip-
ulated. This was accomplished by pairing subjects selected for cognitive
differences (high conflict pairs) and cognitive similarities (low conflict
pairs) to work jointly on a task in which their cognitive differences and
similarities would result in two different levels of cognitive conflict;
high and low cognitive conflict between subjects in the former and latter
pairs, respectively.
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The basic data from the conflict paradigm . The Hammond paradigm allows
quantification of cognitive conflict in terms of the data obtained on each
trial during the conflict stage. These basic data (see Hammond, 1965) are
shown in Figure 2. Here, Tl and T2 represent the prediction that each sub-
ject would make if he followed the policies he developed as a consequence of
his previous natural social experience exactly. The T's are derived from
the multiple regression equation describing the policy each subject used in
coping with the selection task. The scores SI and S2 represent the sub-
jects' initial predictions of the criterion which they exchange and discuss
to reach their joint judgment, J. The scores S'l and S'2 represent the
private predictions which each subject made following the discussion to
' reach a joint judgment. The Y score represents the response that would be ,
correct if the ecological system were not probabilistic, while Y' represents
the feedback received by the subjects.
Cognitive conflict . The basic data were combined to provide measures
of both overt and covert conflict. These two measures allow the experi-
menter to assess the amount of disagreement at both the beginning and the
end of each conflict trial. Overt conflict is measured in terms of the
absolute difference between the subjects' initial predictions, i.e.,
S1-S2 ; covert conflict is measured in terms of the absolute difference
between the private predictions which the subjects made after their dis-
cussion to reach a joint judgment, i.e., S'l- S'2
Since it is possible to measure the total amount of cognitive conflict
generated for each pair of subjects during the task, it becomes possible
to assess how effectively the independent variable has been manipulated;
to ascertain whether there is, in fact, more cognitive conflict experienced
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by the group selected for high conflict (composed of cognitively different
pairs) than in the group selected for low conflict (composed of cognitively
similar pairs)
.
Dependent Variables
Interpersonal attraction . Two measures of interpersonal attraction
were taken; a measure of the extent to which subjects liked their part-
ners and a measure of the extent to which subjects were willing to work
together again with their partners on another experiment. The measures con-
sisted of the subject's numerical ratings of his feelings toward the other
person marked along a continuum divided into 20 units.
Summary
The general purpose of the present study was to examine the relation
between cognitive conflict (the extent to which people think differently
about solutions to their mutual problems) and interpersonal attraction (the
extent to which they are attracted to each other) . This purpose was ac-
complished by using the lens model of cognitive conflict in conjunction
with the methods and procedures associated with the study of interpersonal
attraction. Specifically, subjects were selected for cognitive differences
and similarities to generate high and low cognitive conflict, and measures
of interpersonal attraction were taken after varying amounts of interaction
on the conflict task. In more technical terms, the design may be seen as
a repeated measures one-way analysis of variance comparing the effects of
two levels of cognitive conflict on different measures of interpersonal at-
traction repeated at three different times.
Procedure
The second major aim of the present study was to extend the generality
of the lens model of cognitive conflict to the study of cognitive conflict
over child-rearing practices. In general, prior studies of cognitive con-
flict have involved task materials that were not of immediate personal
relevance to the subjects. Because this study concerned immediate emo-
tional aspects of cognitive conflict, it was important to employ a task
which was of direct personal relevance to subjects. A child- rearing task
was developed for the present study because it was reasoned that it should
be directly relevant to subjects insofar as they have all been children and
will be, or are, parents. While the formal properties of the child-rearing
task remained the same as in prior lens model research (i.e., uncertain
cues to a criterion variable) the unique content of the new task offers
definite advantages for the present study in that it provides issues which
are both personally relevant and controversial.
Selection Procedure
In order to accomplish the aim specified above, a policy assessment
instrument was devised to select pairs of subjects who, presumably as a
consequence of their previous natural social experience thought differently
and similarly about child-rearing practices.
Construction of the selection task . Most of the material needed for
construction of the selection instrument was obtained in a study by Zola
and Rappoport (1968) . The basic procedure for constructing the instrument
was as follows: (1) A series of free response interviews was conducted with
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a representative sample of college students. The interviews consisted of
asking three open-ended questions related to global aspects of rearing
children and were intended to obtain a thorough sampling of beliefs regard-
ing child-rearing characteristics of the college population. (2) From the
information obtained in the interviews, eleven different matters relevant
to child-rearing were extracted for use in a questionnaire. Respondents
rated the relative importance of all eleven matters to rearing well adjusted
children. (3) On the basis of the responses to the questionnaire, three
child- rearing practices were picked as cues to be used in the selection
instrument; permissiveness, use of non-physical discipline, and independence
training. These three child-rearing practices were used as cues because
questionnaire responses to these three items indicated that (1) subjects
regarded all three practices as important to child adjustment, but that
(2) subjects disagreed as to the relative importance of the practices as
determinants of child adjustment. Thus, subjects' responses indicated that
persons existed in a potential subject population who thought similarly and
differently regarding the relative importance of these practices as determ-
inants of child adjustment.
The selection instrument . Using these three child-rearing practices
as cues, an instrument was constructed for selection of subjects with similar
and different policies regarding child- rearing practices. The instrument
consisted of (1) a Case Information Booklet, (2) a Case Judgment Booklet,
and (3) a set of instructions.
The selection task . For the selection task each subject was presented
with: (1) a set of mimeographed instructions; (2) a booklet of 15 stimulus
cards each showing values on three 10-point bar graphs labeled respectively,
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PERMISSIVENESS, USE OF NON-PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE, and INDEPENDENCE TRAINING,
and (3) a booklet of fifteen, 20-point, empty bar graphs titled ADJUSTMENT
DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF SCHOOL, the criterion in terms of which the sub-
ject made his predictions.
The subject predicted the future level of the criterion, adjustment
during the first year of school, from the levels of the three cues, per-
missiveness, use of non-physical discipline, and independence training,
presented on each stimulus card. He recorded prediction for each of the
15 stimulus cards. No feedback was provided the subject as to the accuracy
of his predictions.
Selection instrument instructions . The mimeographed selection instruc-
tions were the same for all of the subjects (see Appendix 1) . These in-
structions informed each subject that his task was "to make a series of
judgments concerning child- rearing practices and their effects." In partic-
ular, he was told to judge "how certain child- rearing practices influence
a child's adjustment in his first year of school." His judgments were to
be made on the basis of information provided in the 15 page CASE INFORMATION
BOOKLET, each page presenting information about a "case study" of a different
child (see Appendix 2 for sample case information sheet) . For each child
the subject was told he would be given the extent to which the following
three child-rearing practices had characterized the child's early childhood.
"(1) the permissiveness of the child's parents, i.e., the degree
to which the child has been free to behave as he wishes;
(2) the use of non-physical discipline, i.e., the degree to which
the child's parents have used non-physical forms of punishment
in disciplining the child; and
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(3) independence training, i.e., the degree to which the child
has been encouraged to make decisions for himself."
The subject was told that his task would be "to examine the individual
information given for each child in the case information booklet, and then
to make a judgment as to how well the child will adjust during his first
year in school."
Specific instructions were given and special materials provided the
subjects for recording their judgments. Each subject received a mimeo-
graphed 15 page CASE JUDGMENT BOOKLET containing a separate page on which to
record his judgment about each case (see Appendix 3 for a sample sheet from
the CASE JUDGMENT BOOKLET) . It was explained to the subject that the judg-
ment scale for each case "is divided into 5 major levels of adjustment"
ranging from "very good adjustment" to "very poor adjustment" with the
general meaning of the five categories described on the judgment scale it-
self (see Appendix 3), and that each of the five categories was subdivided
into four units numbered from one to four within each category to enable the
subject to "express the degree to which you think a given child's adjustment
is described precisely by a given major category of the judgment scale."
In short, the subject was directed to mark his judgments along a criterion
continuum consisting of a 20-point scale divided into five major categories
labeled adjustment during the first year of school.
Each subject was instructed to make a judgment about each of the 15
cases in the CASE INFORMATION BOOKLET and to record his judgment for each
case on a separate page of the CASE INFORMATION BOOKLET.
Subjects
One hundred forty-four females, all undergraduate students at Kansas
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State University filled out the PRIMARY SCHOOL ADJUSTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE.
On the basis of responses to the questionnaire, 30 pairs were selected to
participate in the conflict task.
The subjects volunteered for the experiment entitled, Research on Child
Rearing Practices , in order to earn hours of credit for experimental par-
ticipation. One hour of credit was awarded for filling out the question-
naire and an additional hour of credit was awarded for participating in the
conflict task.
Only females were used as subjects because the study required emotional
involvement in the task and it was reasoned that a task related to "child
rearing practices" would more likely engage the interest of females than
males
.
The purpose of administering the selection task was to assess cognitive
differences and similarities shared by pairs of subjects. In order to carry
out this objective, each subject's 15 responses to the cases presented in
the PRIMARY SCHOOL ADJUSTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE were correlated with all other
subjects' responses to the questionnaire. From the pool of 144 selection
questionnaire respondents, two groups of subjects were selected. The
HIGH CONFLICT GROUP consisted of 15 pairs of subjects selected for cognitive
differences; the average correlation (Pearson product moment) of each sub-
ject's responses with the responses of his partner was -.27. It would have
been desirable to use subjects that were more cognitively different than
the group selected, but relatively few negatively correlated pairs were
obtained
.
The Low Conflict Group consisted of 15 pairs of subjects selected for
cognitive similarities; average correlation of each subject's responses
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with the responses of his partner was .88.
Conflict Procedure
Conflict task . Following selection, two subjects were brought together
and each presented with: (1) a second set of mimeographed instructions,
(2) a set of 15 stimulus cards of the same form as those used in the
selection questionnaire, but with feedback in terms of the criterion printed
on the reverse side, and (3) individual forms for each subject for record-
ing his responses.
Working together, the task for both subjects was to reach a joint pre-
diction of the future level of the criterion, level of adjustment during the
first year of school, on the basis of the given levels of the three cues;
permissiveness, non-physical discipline, and independence training. Each of
15 conflict trials proceeded in the following way: after observing the given
cue values the subjects were requested (1) to make individual predictions
of the level of the criterion, (2) to exchange these individual predictions
with one another, (3) to discuss any differences that occurred, and (4) to
agree on a joint judgment about the level of the criterion.
Each subject's task was to learn to predict the future level of the
criterion from the given levels of the three cues by making predictions for
each stimulus card and checking these predictions against the feedback given
on the reverse side. In order to predict successfully the level of the
criterion, the subject had to learn the cue validities, i.e., the correla-
tions between the cues and the criterion.
Conflict task instructions . Like the instructions for the selection
task, the mimeographed conflict instructions were the same for both subjects
(see Appendix 4) . The instructions informed the subjects that they were
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"to make a series of judgments concerning child-rearing practices and
their effects" on the basis of information presented on CASE INFORMATION
CARDS. For each of the 15 cases presented, the subject was instructed to
"make a judgment as to how well the child will adjust during his first year
of school." The cues to be used in making the judgments were defined and
the method to be used in recording the judgments was discussed. Instruc-
tions regarding the cues, the predicted criterion and the method of record-
ing judgments were identical to those used in the selection task.
Each subject was further informed that he was to work together with his
partner according to the following procedure: After examining the informa-
tion provided on the CASE INFORMATION CARDS and recording his own FIRST
INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT (and after his partner had done the same) , the subject
was directed to reach agreement with his partner on a JOINT JUDGMENT that
"both of you feel is the best judgment as to the level of adjustment." Sub-
jects were informed that they were "free to consult with each other or dis-
cuss the information" in any way they chose . Once a joint judgment had been
agreed upon, it was recorded by the experimenter.
Interpersonal Rating Procedure
Interpersonal rating task . For the interpersonal rating task, each sub-
ject in each conflict pair was presented with: (1) a single sheet of mimeo-
graphed instructions, and (2) a set of three forms for recording his rating
of his feelings toward his partner.
The subject's task was to answer three questions.
(1) "How much do you like your partner compared with all the other
people you know?"
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(2) "How much would you like to work with your partner on another
experiment of this type compared with all the other people
you know?"
(3) "How much do you like the experimenter compared with all the
other people you know?"
The questions were answered by marking individual scales (see Appendix
5) provided for each question. Each interpersonal attraction rating scale
consisted of a continuum of 20 units, divided into four major categories
ranging from "Very Much" to "Below Average" with each category subdivided
into five sub- categories ranging from "hi" to "lo."
Each subject rated his feelings toward his partner and the experimenter
at three different times; immediately after reading the conflict task in-
structions, before interacting with the other person, and after trials 3
and 13 of the conflict task.
Interpersonal attraction task instructions . Like the instructions for
the conflict task, the mimeographed interpersonal attraction task instruc-
tions were the same for both subjects (see Appendix 6) . The instructions
informed each subject that he was to indicate his feelings on the scales
provided toward the person specified and instructed him in how to use the
scales. He was assured that his ratings would be considered confidential
information and would not be communicated to his partner. He was encouraged
to be frank in his ratings and directed not to ponder the ratings but to
put down his first feelings.
Stimulus Materials
Selection and conflict stimulus cards . The format of the stimulus cards
was the same for both the selection and conflict tasks. On the face of each
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8-l/2"by 11" stimulus card were printed three bar graphs, titled PERMIS-
SIVENESS, USE OF NON-PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE, and INDEPENDENCE TRAINING (see Ap-
pendix 3). All three of these bar graphs, which represented 10-point scales,
were divided into 5 equal segments, levels, each of which was further
divided in half to make two units. The five levels were labeled with
captions ranging from "Very High" at the top to "Very Low" at the bottom.
The height of the colored area in the bar indicated scale values, i.e., the
extent to which each of the three factors was present in the homelife of
the child.
Criterion scale
.
Feedback, stated in terms of the criterion scale,
was printed on the reverse side of each of the conflict stimulus cards. No
feedback was used in the selection task. The criterion scale, called LEVEL
OF ADJUSTMENT DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF SCHOOL, was presented as a bar graph.
The format of the criterion bar graph was the same as the format of the bar
graphs representing the cue values (see Figure 4) . However, since the
criterion represented a 20-point rather than a 10-point scale, each of the
five levels was divided into four steps instead of two. Each of the five
levels was labeled with captions ranging from "Very Good Adjustment" to
"Very Poor Adjustment," and each of the four units within a level was
numbered. The height of the colored area in the bar indicated the "correct"
prediction based on the cue values presented on the front of the card.
Cue- criterion correlation for the conflict task stimulus samples . Only
one of the cues, independence training, was a useful predictor of the cri-
terion values; r =-.92. The cue-criterion correlations for the other two
cues, permissiveness and non-physical discipline, were r =-.12 and r = .19,
respectively. The multiple correlation coefficient for all three cues with
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the criterion was r = .93, indicating that the task was partially inde-
terminate. It should be recalled that one of the theoretical conditions
for a cognitive conflict task is probabilistic cue-criterion relations and
indeterminacy or irreducible error. The statistical properties of this
task fulfill these requirements.
Results
Cognitive Conflict
Overt cognitive conflict was measured in terms of the absolute differ-
ence between the individual judgments of paired subjects; IS. - S_J . The
amount of overt conflict was computed for each pair for each conflict trial
and averaged across each successive block of three trials. These average
conflict scores were then averaged across the fifteen pairs of subjects in
each selection group. The average overt conflict scores for each group are
plotted as a function of trial blocks in Figure 3.
The difference between the two groups in average overt conflict for
each of the five three- trial blocks was analyzed by a mixed design analysis
of variance. The analysis of overt conflict scores (see Table 1) shows that
there is significantly more conflict among the cognitively different pairs
TABLE 1
Analysis of Variance of Overt Conflict Scores
Source SS DF MS ET
22.93 1 22.932 1 14.9196*
7.49 4 1.872 2 .9158
7.97 4 1.992 2 .9744
Groups (B)
Blocks (A)
A by B
Error Terms
Subj. W. Groups (1) 43.04 28 1.537
A x Subj. W. Groups (2) 228.93 112 2.044
*p < .005
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function of trial blocks for selected groups of cognitively simi-
lar and dissimilar subjects.
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than there is among the cognitively similar pairs (F = 14.92, p < .005).
There is no significant effect for either trial blocks or groups by trials
interaction.
These results demonstrate that the selection of subjects for cognitive
differences and similarities is an effective technique for producing signif-
icantly different levels of cognitive conflict between subjects . In terms
of the design of the present study, these results are presented as evidence
of the successful manipulation of the independent variable; subjects selected
for cognitive differences did, in fact, show significantly more cognitive
conflict than subjects selected for cognitive similarities.
Cognitive Conflict and Interpersonal Attraction
Interpersonal attraction was measured in terms of numerical ratings on
a scale running from 1 to 20 representing the subjects' feelings toward the
persons they were asked to rate. Two different measures of interpersonal
attraction were taken; measures of the degree to which subjects liked the
other person (hereafter called the "Like" measure) , and measures of the ex-
tent to which subjects were willing to work together again with the same
person on another experiment (hereafter called the "Work" measure) . The
interpersonal attraction ratings were repeated at three different times dur-
ing the experiment; immediately prior to the conflict task (at time-0), and
during the conflict task after trials 3 and 13.
The average interpersonal attraction scores for each of the two, 15-
pair conflict groups are plotted as a function of trials in Figures 4, 5, 6
and 7. The attraction functions for each of the two conflict groups are
based on the mean of the attraction ratings recorded by each pair of subjects
in each conflict group at each time, i.e., the average of the summed
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attraction ratings of individual pair members.
Figure 4 shows the attraction of subjects in each of the two conflict
groups for their partners immediately prior to and during the conflict task.
The attraction ratings recorded are based on the Like measure of attraction;
i.e., how much each subject recorded that he liked his partner. Figure 5
differs from Figure 4 only in that the attraction ratings in Figure 5 are
based on the Work measure of attraction; i.e., how much each subject recorded
that he would like to work further with his partner. Figure 6 is based on a
combination of the Like and Work measures of attraction; subjects' Work and
Like ratings recorded at each point in time were added together and the sums
averaged for each group. Figure 7 shows the attraction of subjects in each
conflict group for the experimenter and is based on the Like measure of
attraction.
Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 correspond to Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7, respec-
tively. The data base for the two series of figures is exactly the same;
the only difference between the two sets of figures is that whereas Figures
4, 5, 6 and 7 are based on attraction scores, Figures 8, 9, 10 and 11 are
based on attraction change scores. Change scores are computed from the dif-
ference in attraction scores recorded at two different points in time; the
measure recorded first chronologically is subtracted from the measure re-
corded last and the difference equals the change score recorded for that unit
of time. Attraction change scores are analyzed in the present study rather
than attraction scores because there is some evidence (see Figures 4, 5, 6
and 7) that the high conflict group was pre-disposed to make consistently
higher interpersonal attraction ratings at time-0 than the low conflict
group. The largest difference in initial interpersonal attraction ratings
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Fig. 8. Mean change in interpersonal attraction ratings per pair plotted
as a function of trials for two groups of subjects selected for
high and low cognitive conflict respectively. Based on the Like
measure of attraction.
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as a function of trials for two groups of subjects selected for
high and low cognitive conflict respectively. Based on the Work
measure of attraction.
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bined Like and Work measures of attraction.
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Experimenter plotted as a function of trials for two groups of
subjects selected for high and low cognitive conflict respec-
tively. Based on the Like measure of attraction.
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for the two conflict groups appears at time-0 with the Like measure (see
Figure 4), but the difference is not significant (t = 1.44, p > .10). Never-
theless, by using change scores in the analysis of attraction ratings, the
high and low conflict groups are equated for initial levels of interpersonal
attraction at time-0.
Linear trends in attraction change scores
. The relation between cog-
nitive conflict and interpersonal attraction was examined by means of a
linear trend analysis of the attraction change scores. The change in inter-
personal attraction across time was analyzed by fitting a least squares re-
gression line to the interpersonal attraction change scores recorded across
the three points in time.
In order to ascertain whether there were significant linear trends, the
slopes of the attraction change curves for both levels of selected conflict
were tested against zero. The results of these analyses are presented in
Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
TABLE 2
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Like" Scores Against Zero
Source of Variation SS DF MS F
Total
From C •
Within Groups
* p < .05
95.50 30
18.15 1 18.15
77.35 29 2.67
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TABLE 3
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
Low Conflict Group "Like" Scores Against Zero
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total 194.00 30
From C 123.27 1 123.27 50.54*
Within Groups 70.73 29 2.44
* p < .01
TABLE 4
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Work" Scores Against Zero
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total 107.50 30
From C .15 1 .15 .04
Within Groups 107.35 29 3.70
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TABLE 5
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
Low Conflict Group "Work" Scores Against Zero
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total
From C
Within Groups
274.00 30
101.40 1 101.40
172.60 29 5.95
17.04*
* p < .01
TABLE 6
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Like" Scores Against Zero (for Experimenter)
Source of Variation
Total
From C
Within Groups
SS
81.50
7.35
74.15
DF
30
1
29
MS
7.35
2.56 .
2.87
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TABLE 7
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
Low Conflict Group "Like" Scores Against Zero (for Experimenter)
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total
From C 28.02 1 28.0: 14.13*
Within Groups
85.50 30
02
57.48 29 1.98
* p < .01
The results of the trend analysis presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and
• 7 indicate that there is a significant positive linear increase in attrac-
tion for both high and low conflict groups across trials for the Like mea-
sure of attraction (see Tables 2 and 3) . The Work measure of interpersonal
attraction also shows a significant positive linear increase across trials
for the low conflict group (see Table 5) , but not for the high conflict
group (see Table 4) . Attraction ratings of liking for the experimenter,
the control condition, show a significant positive linear increase for the
low conflict group (see Table 7) , but not for the high conflict group (see
Table 6) . Examination of the graphs of the attraction functions and the
results from the linear trend analysis of attraction change scores may be
summarized as indicating a general tendency for all subjects to show an in-
crease in their attraction ratings across time.
Group comparisons . In order to ascertain whether there were signifi-
cant differences in the attraction change curves for the high and low con-
flict groups, the trends of the attraction change curves for the two groups
were analyzed against each other. The results of these analyses are
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presented in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11.
TABLE 8
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Like" Scores Against Low Conflict
Group "Like" Scores
Source of Variation
Total
From C
From BC
Within Groups
* p < .01
SS DF MS
289.50 60
118.01 1 118.01 46.22*
23.41 1 23.41 9.17*
148.08 58 2.55
TABLE 9
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Work" Scores Against Low Conflict
Group "Work" Scores
Source of Variation
Total
From C
From BC
Within Groups
SS DF MS
381.50 60
54.67 1 54.67 11.33*
46.87 1 46.87 9.71*
279.95 58 4.83
* p < .01
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TABLE 10
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores;
High Conflict Group "Like" + "Work" Scores Against Low Con-
flict Group "Like" + "Work" Scores
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total
From C
From BC
Within Groups
* p < .01
671.00 120
166.67 1 166.67 45.10*
68.27 1 68.27 18.47*
436.07 118 3.70
TABLE 11
Analysis of Linear Trend of Interpersonal Attraction Change Scores:
High Conflict Group "Like" Scores (for Experimenter)
Against Low Conflict Group "Like" Scores
(for Experimenter)
Source of Variation SS DF MS
Total
From C
From BC
Within Groups
* p < .01
167.00 60
32.03 1 32.03 14.11*
3.33 1 3.33 1.47
131.63 58 2.27
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The results of the trend analyses presented in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11
reflect the same general tendency for attraction scores to show a linear
increase across time (see "From C" entries in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11). The
attraction change scores collapsed across conflict groups show a significant
linear increase for both the Like and Work measures of attraction combined
(see Table 10) , and also for both of the measures considered invidually
(see Tables 8 and 9) . Finally even the Liking change scores for the ex-
perimenter reflected the same general increase across time (see Table 11)
.
However, when the attraction change curves for the high and low con-
flict groups are contrasted (see "From BC" entries in Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11}
their rate of increase proves to be significantly different. For both the
Like and the Work measures of attraction, considered together (see Table 10)
or considered individually (see Tables 8 and 9), the low conflict group
shows a significantly faster rate of increase than does the high conflict
group (p < .01) . In the control condition, however, the ratings of attrac-
tion for the experimenter do not show a differential rate of increase for
the two conflict groups (see Table 11)
.
The major results of the present study may be summarized as follows:
(1) Fifteen pairs of subjects in both the low and high conflict ex-
perimental conditions show increased interpersonal attraction as a function
of trials
.
(2)= The increase in attraction in the low conflict condition is sig-
nificantly greater than the increase in attraction in the high conflict
condition.
Discussion
The aims of the present study were as follows: (1) The empirical aim
was to examine the relationship between cognitive conflict and interpersonal
attraction. It was hypothesized that cognitive conflict is inversely re-
lated to interpersonal attraction. (2) The methodological aim was to extend
the generality of the lens model paradigm of cognitive conflict by (a) ex-
amining an emotional consequence of cognitive conflict, and (b) employing
a new substantive task involving child-rearing material that should generate
emotional arousal in subjects. With respect to these aims, results obtained
in the present study will be discussed at two different levels; first at
the empirical level and then at the methodological level.
Cognitive Conflict and Interpersonal Attraction
Two important empirical results were obtained in this study. First,
all subjects showed a general tendency to increase their attraction ratings
as a function of trials in the conflict task. Second, the increase in at-
traction in the low conflict condition was significantly greater than the
increase in attraction in the high conflict condition.
Thus it may be concluded that the amount of cognitive conflict exper-
ienced between subjects in a decision-making task does significantly affect
interpersonal attraction. While all pairs of subjects tend to show a defin-
ite increase in attraction across time, the subjects experiencing less cog-
nitive conflict show a tendency to increase their attraction for each other
at a faster rate than those subjects experiencing more cognitive conflict.
In short, the effect of cognitive conflict on interpersonal attraction
seems to be to significantly inhibit or suppress the increase of interpersonal
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attraction across time.
How are these two findings to be explained? Both findings are entirely
consistent with a reinforcement theory of interpersonal attraction (see
Newcomb, 1956; Byrne, 1961; and pp. 20-22 of the present paper). It has
been theorized that attraction between persons is a function of the extent
to which reciprocal rewards are present in their interaction. Through the
operation of consensual validation, cognitive similarities should be reci-
procally reinforcing and cognitive dissimilarities should be nonreinforcing.
It follows therefore that subjects under conditions of low cognitive con-
flict should experience greater rewards in their interaction and should in-
crease their attraction for each other at a faster rate than persons inter-
acting under conditions of high cognitive conflict. The finding that at-
traction between all subjects shows a general tendency to increase over
trials follows from the reasonable assumption that subjects in both con-
flict conditions are probably more alike than different in their totality
of attitudes as a consequence of their common membership in the female,
undergraduate, university community.
Since subjects were not in cognitive conflict with the experimenter,
the ratings of attraction for the experimenter served as a control condi-
tion. The fact that the increase in attraction for the experimenter was
not significantly different for the two experimental groups supports the
contention that the differential increase in attraction evidenced by the
two conflict groups is attributable to the effects of different levels of
cognitive conflict on interpersonal attraction.
The tendency of the high conflict group to make higher initial (time-0)
interpersonal attraction ratings than the low conflict group remains
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unexplained. While the difference between the two conflict groups in ini-
tial attraction ratings does not achieve significance, the tendency is con-
sistent for both the Like and Work measures of attraction and obtains not
only in the initial attraction ratings for the experimenter, but also per-
sists inexplicably in the later measures of attraction for the experimenter
taken after trials 3 and 13 of the conflict task. It should be stressed,
however, that: (1) the differences do not achieve significance, and (2) the
major findings of this study are based on analyses of attraction change scores
which equates the conflict groups for initial levels of interpersonal
attraction.
Extending the Generality of the Lens Model
The generality of the lens model was extended by the present study in
three ways. First, a substantively new conflict task was generated and the
lens model paradigm was applied for the first time to cognitive conflict
over the effects of child-rearing practices, an important area of inter-
personal decision-making. Second, cognitive conflict was studied for the
first time as an independent variable operating on a dependent variable
formally and substantively outside the framework of the lens model paradigm.
Showing that cognitive conflict affects interpersonal attraction, an im-
portant variable outside the framework of the lens model, increases the
construct validity of cognitive conflict. Third, by replicating Rappoport's
(1967) finding that different levels of cognitive conflict can be generated
by pairing subjects selected for cognitive differences and similarities, the
present study extends the generality of the selection method for generating
different levels of cognitive conflict.
In discussing the methodological implications of the present study,
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it is important to consider some important differences between the design
of the present study and the designs employed by Byrne and Newcomb discussed
above. The methodology of the present study offers an advantage over Byrne's
methodology in that it allows changes in interpersonal attraction to be
studied as a consequence of social interaction . Byrne's method of asking
subjects to rate their attraction for a bogus stranger on the basis of
"his" responses to an attitude questionnaire precludes interaction between
the subject and the person he is asked to rate. Such a limitation raises
serious questions regarding the generality of Byrne's findings to situa-
tions outside the laboratory.
While Newcomb' s design allowed interaction between subjects in a natural
social environment, his results are equivocal because it is not clear exactly
what variables were influencing attraction ratings. There was no control
condition, and Newcomb was unable to go beyond demographic and attitude
questionnaire data in specifying in what ways his subjects were different
and similar. The lens model methodology employed in the present study offers
an advantage over Newcomb' s methodology in that it allows the experimenter
to specify precisely the amount and the way in which subjects differ
cognitively.
Implications for Further Research
First, the finding that cognitive conflict between persons engaged in a
decision-making task affects their attraction for each other raises ques-
tions as to what the other consequences of cognitive conflict might be.
The effects of cognitive conflict on other dependent variables should be
investigated. For example, it would be interesting to study the effects of
cognitive conflict on joint and individual cognitive adaptation to the
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environment
.
Second, the effect of lens model variables other than cognitive con-
flict on interpersonal attraction needs to be studied. For example, one
might study the effects of different modes of conflict resolution, compro-
mise and capitulation, on interpersonal attraction. While it was beyond
the intent of the present study to analyze all of the outputs of the lens
model paradigm, it should be noted that much more data were collected than
were presented here.
Finally, it would be interesting to investigate the effects of inter-
personal attraction as an independent variable influencing the dependent
variables of the lens model paradigm of cognitive conflict. For example,
one might study the effects of different levels of interpersonal attraction
on the method persons employ to resolve their cognitive conflict.
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APPENDIX 1
Selection Instrument Instructions
PRIMARY SCHOOL ADJUSTMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
Explanation of the Task ;
We want you to make a series of judgments concerning childrearing prac-
tices and their effects. In particular we want you to judge how certain
childrearing practices influence a child's adjustment in his first year of
school. Two types of task materials have been provided you: (1) a case in-
formation booklet, and (2) a case judgment booklet.
The case information booklet contains information about case studies of
15 different children. For each child you will be given the extent to which
the following three factors have characterized the child's early childhood.
The three factors are:
(1) the permissiveness of the child's parents, i.e., the degree to which
the child has been free to behave as he wishes;
(2) the use of non-physical discipline,' i.e., the degree to which the
child's parents have used non-physical forms of punishment in disciplining
the child; and
(3) independence training, i.e., the degree to which the child has been
encouraged to make decisions for himself.
Experts in psychology and education agree that these factors are critical
determinants of the child's school adjustment, but opinions vary as to which
factors are most or least important. Your task will be to examine the infor-
mation given for each child in the case information booklet, and then to make
a judgment as to how well the child will adjust during his first year in
school.
How to Record Your Judgments :
For each of the 15 cases presented in the case information booklet,
there is a page in the booklet which presents information about the extent to
which the three factors described above were present in the child's home.
The case judgment booklet contains a separate page on which to record yourjudgment about each case. The judgment' scale for each case (see the casejudgment booklet) is divided into 5 major levels of adjustment: very good
adjustment, above average adjustment, average adjustment, below average
adjustment, and very poor adjustment. The general meaning of these five
categories is described on the judgment scale itself. Since most persons
have difficulty expressing their views precisely using only these five major
categories, each of the five categories is subdivided so that you may express
the degree to which you think a given child's adjustment is described pre-
cisely by a given major category of the judgment scale.
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The general procedure to follow in making your judgments is this: first,
decide which of the 5 major categories is most appropriate; then, decide
whether the child's adjustment will be closer to the category immediately
above or immediately below the one you have selected. For example , if you
think the child will make an average school adjustment, but is likely to be
very close to being above average, circle the number 4 in the average cate-
gory. If you think he will be moderately close to the above average cate-
gory, circle the number 3; moderately close to the below average category,
circle the number 2; very close to the below average category, circle the
number 1.
Summary of Instructions ;
For each of the 15 cases examine the information given in the case in-
formation booklet , record your judgment of the child's adjustment in the
case judgment booklet , and then go on _to the next case . When you have judged
case 15, you are finished with the questionnaire.
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Case
APPENDIX 2
Sample Case Information Card
Number
CASE INFORMATION CARD
Very
High
Very
High
Very
High
Above
Average
Above
Average
Above
Average
Average Average Average
Below
Average
Below
'
Average
Below
Average
Very
Low
Very
Low
Very
Low
PERKESSIVENESS USE
PHYSI
DISCI
F NON-
CAL
PLINE
INDEPENDENCE
TRAINING
SCALE VALUES indicate the extent to which each of the three factors has
characterized a given child's early childhood, i.e., the extent
to which each factor was present in the homelife of the child.
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APPENDIX 3
Sample Sheet from Case Judgment Booklet
Case Number
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
4
3
2
1
Very Good Adjustment
The child is very enthusiastic about school, likes
and is well liked by his teachers and classmates,
and learns very easily.
Above Average Adjustment
The child actively enjoys school, gets along very
well with his classmates, and learns rapidly.
Average Adjustment
The child likes school, gets along well with most
of his classmates, and shows satisfactory progress
in his learning.
Below Average Adjustment
The child is reluctant to attend school, makes few
friends, and appears to be a slow learner.
Very Poor Adjustment
The child must be forced to attend school, dislikes
most of his classmates, and appears to be learning
nothing
.
ADJUSTMENT DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF SCHOOL
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APPENDIX 4
Conflict Task Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
Explanation of the Task ;
We want you to make a series of judgments concerning childrearing
practices and their effects. In particular, we want you to judge how certain
childrearing practices influence a child's adjustment in his first year of
school.
The CASE INFORMATION CARDS in front of you contain information about
case studies of 15 different children. For each child you will be given the
extent to which the following three factors have characterized the child's
early childhood. The three factors are:
(1) the PERMISSIVENESS of the child's parents, i.e., the degree to which
the child has been free to behave as he wishes;
(2) the USE OF NON-PHYSICAL DISCIPLINE, i.e., the degree to which the
child's parents have used non-physical forms' of punishment in disciplining
the child; and
(3) INDEPENDENCE TRAINING, i.e., the degree to which the child has been
encouraged to make decisions for himself.
In brief, your task is to examine the information given for each case
and then to make a judgment as to how well the child will adjust during his
first year in school.
How to Record Your Judgments :
For each of the 15 cases presented on the case information cards, there
is a corresponding sheet in the INDIVIDUAL CASE JUDGMENT BOOKLET. The indi-
vidual case judgment booklet contains a separate page on which to record your
judgment about each case. The judgment scale for each case (see the indi-
vidual case judgment booklet) is divided into 5 major levels of adjustment:
very good adjustment, above average adjustment, average adjustment, below
average adjustment, and very poor adjustment. The general meaning of these
five categories is described on the judgment scale itself.
Since most persons have difficulty expressing their views precisely
using only these five major categories, each of the five categories is sub-
divided so that you may express the degree to which you think a given child's
adjustment is described precisely by a given major category of the judgment
scale.
The genera 1 procedure to follow in making your judgments is this: first,
decide which of the 5 major categories is most appropriate; then, decide
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whether the child's adjustment will be closer to the category immediately
above or immediately below the one you have selected. For example , if you
think the child will make an average school adjustment, but is likely to be
very close to being above average, circle the number 4 in the average cate-
gory. If you think he will be moderately close to the above average category,
circle the number 3; moderately close to the below average category, circle
the number 2; very close to the below average category, circle the number 1.
Working Together on the Task ;
In carrying out the task, you are to work together according to the
following procedure:
First , examine the information presented for each individual case. Then re-
cord your own judgment of the child's school adjustment in your individual
case judgment booklet on the scale labelled FIRST INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT. Do
this without consulting your partner.
Second , on the basis of what you know about your partner, you are to predict
what your partner's judgment of the child's adjustment will be. Record your
prediction in the individual case judgment booklet on the scale labelled
PREDICTION OF PARTNER'S JUDGMENT. Do this, of course, without consulting
with your partner.
Third , after each of you has recorded your individual judgment and your pre-
diction of your partner's judgment, you are to reach a single, collective
or JOINT JUDGMENT for the case. You are now free to consult with each other
or discuss the information in any way you choose. Once you have agreed on
what both of you feel is the best judgment as to the level of adjustment,
relate your joint judgment to me in order that I may record it.
Fourth , after your joint judgment has been recorded, you are to make a
SECOND individual judgment of the level of adjustment for the same case.
Record this judgment in your individual case judgment booklet on the scale
labelled SECOND INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT. Since the discussion may have raised
points which you had not previously considered, this second individual
judgment need not be consistent with either your first individual judgment
or the joint judgment. Feel free to make this second individual judgment
according to how you see the situation at that time.
Fifth , after recording your second individual judgment, the case information
card is to be turned over to enable you to see the correct answer before
going on to the next case.
Summary of Instructions :
(1) You are individually to make a FIRST INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT and a
PREDICTION OF YOUR PARTNER'S JUDGMENT.
(2) Then, you are jointly to reach agreement on a single JOINT JUDGMENT
which you are to relate tome so that I may record it.
(3) Next, you are individually to make a SECOND INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT.
(4) Finally, you are to note the correct answer on the back of the case
information card and then proceed to the next card .
73
APPENDIX 5
Interpersonal Attraction Rating Scales
IPA AFTER
HI VERY MUCH CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI ABOVE AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI BELOW AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER
SCALE #1. On scale #1 you are
to RATE HOW MUCH YOU LIKE YOUR
PARTNER in comparison with all
of the other people that you
know. Mark an "X" in the cate-
gory space which best corre-
sponds to the way that you feel
about your partner.
Scale #1
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IPA AFTER YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER
HI VERY MUCH CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI ABOVE AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI BELOW AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
SCALE #2. On scale #2 you are
to RATE HOW MUCH YOU WOULD LIKE
TO WORK WITH YOUR PRESENT
PARTNER ON ANOTHER EXPERIMENTAL
TASK OF THIS SORT. Mark an
"X" in the category space which
best corresponds to the way
that you feel about your
partner.
Scale #2
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IPA AFTER YOUR SUBJECT NUMBER
HI VERY MUCH CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI ABOVE AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
HI BELOW AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
SCALE #3. On scale #3 you are
to RATE HOW MUCH YOU LIKE THE
EXPERIMENTER in comparison
with all of the other people
that you know. Mark an "X"
in the category which best
corresponds to the way that
you feel about the experimenter.
Scale #3
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APPENDIX 6
Interpersonal Attraction Rating Instructions
INSTRUCTIONS
Explanation of the INTERPERSONAL RATING PROCEDURE ;
Using the three scales provided, you are to indicate your feelings
toward the specified other person in the following manner; MARK AN "X"
IN THE CATEGORY SPACE WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE WAY YOU FEEL ABOUT THE
PERSON YOU ARE ASKED TO RATE. Note that each large category on the scales,
e.g., AVERAGE, is divided into five sub-categories ranging from HI, e.g.,
HI AVERAGE, to LO, e.g., LO AVERAGE. Note the sample rating-
-"ABOVE
AVERAGE AVERAGE."
LO
HI AVERAGE CATEGORY
ABOVE AVERAGE
AVERAGE
BELOW AVERAGE
LO
v
HI
Please be frank in making your ratings. Your ratings are confidential,
They will only be identified by your subject number, and your partner will
not see the ratings you make.
Do not ponder the ratings. Put down your first feelings; BE
IMPULSIVE .
When you have finished making your ratings, please TURN THE RATING
SHEETS OVER ON YOUR DESK and wait for further instructions.
THE EPTECTS OP COGNITIVE CONFLICT ON
INTERPERSONAL ATTRACTION
by
CARL EDWIN KUHLMAN
B. A., The University of Kansas, 1964
AN ABSTRACT OP A THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
MASTER OP SCIENCE
Department of Psychology
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1968
This study relates two hitherto separate problem areas in
psychology: interpersonal conflict and interpersonal attraction.
In the former area, research has generally focused on the stimulus
situation as the cause of disagreements. Game theory studies
are based on manipulation of pay-off conditions, and cognitive
conflict studies demonstrate that conflict can be generated by
discrepant meanings persons assign to stimuli. In the latter area,
studies show that persons with similar attitudes generally like
each other better, or are attracted to each other more, than per-
sons with dissimilar attitudes. The present study brings these
two lines of work together by placing subjects in a cognitive
conflict situation and tapping their emotional feelings toward
each other as they work through a conflict task.
The conflict task required subjects to agree on a series of
judgments concerning the effects of certain child-rearing practices.
Pifteen pairs of female subjects who thought differently about
the child-rearing practices, and who therefore were expected to
disagree, were compared with fifteen pairs of females who thought
similarly about the child-rearing practices. Results show:
(a) that subject pairs in the former group disagree with each
other significantly more than pairs in the latter group, (b) that
while all pairs show evidence of an increase in interpersonal attrac-
tion during the task, pairs in the latter group who experience
less conflict, show a significantly greater increase in attraction
than pairs in the former group.
These results are interpreted as evidence of a clear relation-
ship between cognitive and emotional aspects of interpersonal
conflict. The amount of cognitive conflict experienced by subjects
working on a decision-making task has a significant effect on how
much they like each other. Discussion of this finding emphasizes
possibilities for future research, including comparisons with
male subject pairs, and exploration of other cognitive and emo-
tional aspects of interpersonal conflict.
